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CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION

The relationship between economic development and democratization has been a hotly
debated topic in political science for many years. Students of Chinese politics have long been
concerned about the potential democratic transformation caused by the economic liberalization
of this Socialist country dominated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for over five
decades. Despite dramatic domestic economic reforms and a much more engaged and open
posture vis-à-vis the outside world, the CCP has not dramatically changed its authoritarian way
of governance. Some observers have argued that the authoritarian government will be able to
adjust and consolidate, thereby allowing it to stay in power. However, the constant social
changes in China brought about by recent economic development have started to put increasing
pressure on the state for political changes. The emergence of a new middle class and its
members’ numerous social and political demands are among the most pressing challenges facing
the Chinese state in this period of rapid economic change.
However, as scholars of China have started to explore the political leanings of the new
middle class in China and what role it will play in transforming the political structure of China,
the results have not been very clear. On the one hand, the middle class members are expected to
demand political opening because they are wealthier and better educated. On the other hand,
they may withdraw such demands if they are afraid that their wealth and social status could be
taken from them by the Communist authority and destroyed by political changes. The latter has
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made some scholars argue that it is unlikely that the middle class members in China will
participate in politics to demand political changes.
The emergence of some middle class campaigners running for District-level People’s
Congress (DPC) elections in 2003 has given us an opportunity to study the Chinese middle
class’s attitudes toward political participation and whether their desire for participation will
contribute to democratization in China. During these elections in Shenzhen and Beijing, dozens
of middle class Chinese conducted election campaigns to be nominated as candidates and elected
as people’s deputies (renda daibiao) to the DPCs, a relatively powerless organization in Chinese
political structure.
This thesis examines the motivations of the middle class members for participating in
politics. It is especially interested in exploring why the middle class members wanted to run for
people’s deputies in the DPCs that do not have real political power, and how their behavior
might influence political change in China. Moreover, by studying the Chinese middle class’
political attitudes, the thesis tries to shed light on the middle class’s roles in democratization in
general.
By systematically analyzing the candidates’ campaign speeches and activities and their
speeches during the media interviews, this study reveals that the major motivating factors behind
the middle class DPC candidates’ decision to run for the elections were to protect their property
interests and their increasing desire to defend political rights. This thesis argues that the
campaigners’ actions in Shenzhen and Beijing will affect the democratization process in China in
two ways. First, it will help to legitimize the democratic and competitive election procedures in
future grassroots elections in China. Second, the fact that the campaigners applied legalistic
means to defend their political rights granted by the state law also indicated a change in the way
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middle class members confront the authoritarian state. This thesis suggests that the legalistic
means used by the DPC election campaigners will pose a threat to the monopoly of power by the
CCP and incur potential institutional changes in China in the future.

2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The study of the new middle class’s motivations to run for local elections is important as
it could help us understand the tendency of their political participation and how the participation
would affect the existing political structure. The Chinese middle class candidates’ decision to
run for the DPC elections is exclusively worth investigating considering the fact that the people’s
congress system is not given real political power in the status quo of the Chinese politics. The
study on the subject may help us see the changes of people’s views on local people’s congresses
and politics in general. This section will explore why running for people’s congress elections is
unusual in China and lay out the research questions that this thesis will seek to answer.
The people’s Congress in China is granted superior power by the Chinese Constitution.
“All power in the People's Republic of China belongs to the people. The organs through which
the people exercise state power are the National People's Congress and the local people's
congresses at different levels.”1 People’s deputies at various levels of congresses are elected by
the Chinese people to represent their interests and will do so by participating “in the exercise of
State power in accordance with the functions and powers vested in the people's congresses at the
corresponding levels by the Constitution and relevant laws.”2
The law endows many functions to People’s Congress and deputies such as monitoring
the government, legislation, appointment of bureaucrats, decision-making on substantial policies,
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etc. However, in reality, the primary role of the people’s congress system is “more nominal than
real” (Nathan 1985, 194). People’s deputies basically serve as a “link” (niudai) between the
government and the people. They represent the “state authority” and are responsible to provide
“a rationale for policy” made by the state and diffuse “societal pressures” (O’Brien 1994, 359).3
In other words, rather than representing the interests of voters, people’s deputies appear to be
unpaid government staff whose job is to mobilize “the masses to implement decisions made by
the central government rather than actually making decisions” (Shi 1999b, 1118). Because the
Chinese People’s Congress has “a less powerful political status than governments, not to mention
the Party,” it has been largely regarded as a rubber stamp (Young 2002, 726). Overtime, this has
become an informal but widely recognized rule in the Chinese political system.
The direct election of Local People’s Congress (LPC) and indirect election of people’s
congresses of higher levels have also been strictly controlled by the CCP.4 Although the CCP
amended the election law5 in the late 1970s to let voters directly elect the deputies to local
people’s congresses, nominate candidates, choose among multiple candidates, and vote secretly,
it has continued to control the entire process of LPC elections such as voter registration,
nomination, mobilizing voters, duration of election campaigns, etc. The amended election law
also prohibits formation of political parties and precludes electoral competition6.
Given the constraints of LPC elections from the CCP and considering the weakness of the
People’s Congress, Chinese voters usually vote without enthusiasm, and very few would bother
to run for LPC elections. As suggested by McCormick’s research on Chinese local people’s
congress elections, even after their candidacy was confirmed, candidates had not intended to
become a deputy and had not taken any effort to secure their elections. McCormick concluded
that, “candidates rarely campaign in the usual sense of that word” (McCormick 1996, 40-41).
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Election campaigning is almost unimaginable to the Chinese people especially after the
election law was amended in 1982. The amended election law in 1979 once stated, “The
political parties, mass organizations and voters may introduce deputy candidates by all kinds of
means” (Yuan 2003, 223). Then in the 1980 LPC elections, some college students and workers
in Beijing, Changsha and Shanghai ran election campaigns by organizing rallies and passing
literatures to test the amended law (Nathan 1985, 205-07). Worried that the heated campaigning
activities were producing potential “social disorder”, the National People’s Congress (NPC)
amended the law in 1982 and specified the ways candidates could interact with voters and call
for their support (Nathan 1985, 223). It states, “The electoral committee or the presidium of the
people's congress shall brief the voters or deputies on the personal circumstances of candidates
for deputy. The political parties, mass organizations, voters or deputies who recommend
candidates may brief group meetings of voters or deputies about the candidates they are
recommending.”7 However, the effects of such “group meetings” are limited. Normally voters
are only briefed with very basic information of the candidates such as education level, party
affiliation, employment, awards, etc. Therefore, voters lack the knowledge of candidates’ skills
and capacities that are necessary for them to make wise decisions in casting votes. Since then,
voters have become further alienated from participating in the elections (Yuan 2003, 224) and
there have been very few election campaigns.8 For a long time, the word jingxuan (election
campaign), which is believed to be a feature of the “Western capitalism”, has been a taboo
among electoral officials and staff.9
In 2003, however, election campaigns were revived during the urban DPC elections in
Shenzhen and Beijing. In April and May, 8 citizens in Shenzhen sought candidacies to be
elected as people’s deputies in the DPC elections. Most of them reached out to publicize
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themselves by putting up posters, handing out flyers and name cards, and mailing letters of selfintroduction to local residents. One of the write-in candidates won the election by a big lead
over two final candidates.
Seven months later, during the DPC elections in Beijing, 27 citizens conducted election
campaigns to be nominated and elected. In addition to passing out flyers and putting up posters,
campaigners in Beijing also distributed brochures of election law to voters and posted campaign
speeches at online discussion boards. One of the campaigners even set up a 3-member campaign
office to help him win the election.
It is interesting to note that many campaigners in Shenzhen and Beijing came from the
middle class that is newly emerging from the decades of economic reforms of China. For
example, at least three campaigners in Shenzhen were homeowners and at least three worked for
private enterprises as opposed to the Socialist danwei.10 In Beijing, the 26 campaigners were
college students, university professors, lawyers and businessmen. At least nine were
homeowners who wished to represent the interests of homeowners.
One may wonder if there is a link between the social class of the campaigners and their
motivations in running for the DPC elections. If so, considering the fact that the DPC elections
have been practically ignored by most voters for two decades, what inspired these middle class
campaigners to run for the elections in 2003? More importantly, why did they want to run for a
political position that is largely symbolic in the Chinese political system? Will the campaign
activities in 2003 exert any effects on democratic elections in China in the future? What does the
Chinese middle class’s campaigning behavior say about the influences of middle class on
democratization in general? The rest of this thesis will try to address these issues.
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES

In order to study the motivations of the middle class members in China to participate in
local elections, one needs to understand the logic behind the effects of socio-economic changes
on political development and what role the middle class plays in this process. In the Chinese
case in particular, one needs to understand what concerns the Chinese new middle class members
most and how these concerns affect their decision to participate in politics. This section will
review the existing literature on middle class and political development, and the literature on the
development of the Chinese middle class.
The relationship between the emergence of middle class and political transformation has
long been debated in the field of comparative politics. Lipset once suggested that the larger the
size of the new middle class, the higher the chance for democracy to flourish (Lipset 1981). In
his seminal paper, Lipset hypothesized a causal relationship between high levels of economic
development and the prevalence of democracy, and explained that rising incomes would mitigate
class conflicts so that the lower strata could be tolerated (Lipset 1959, 69-105). Similarly, in
explaining how various factors brought about by economic development could sustain
democracy, Huntington stated that since democracy means majority rule, it is “only possible if
the majority is a relatively satisfied middle class, and not an impoverished majority confronting
an inordinately wealthy oligarchy” (Huntington 1984, 199).
The social mobilization theory posits that economic development increases the
interaction between individuals and states, which, in turn, encourages people to participate in
political decision-making processes (Shi 1999a, 425-44). Mobilization theory also posits that
economic development alters social class structure by expanding the middle class. As greater
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portions of the population become educated and wealthy, they will become more interested in
political decision-making, more sensitive to the political opportunities available, and more active
in political participation (Nie, Powell and Prewitt 1969, 374). As Lipset et al. argued, “People
with more income, in complex and widely interdependent work situations, with more education,
and more access to health and other services are more likely to ask for increased political
freedom” (Lipset, Seong, and Torres 1993, 166). These arguments are supported by many cases
of democratization in the real world. China’s neighbors, Taiwan and South Korea for example,
were democratized in the late 1980s partly due to the increasing political demands from the
fledging middle class in their domestic societies.
There are alternative views on the relationship between middle class and democratic
development during the economic development. For example, Huntington himself once warned
that the middle class could be anti-democratic when they are threatened by working class
movements (Huntington 1991, 66). In her literature review of democratization theories, Eva
Bellin identified the capitalist class and working class as the two social forces in fostering
democratic change. She mentioned that some scholars hold the view that “while capitalists
supported the introduction of representative government and the protection of civil liberties, they
opposed the extension of political rights to the lower classes” (Bellin 2000, 176). Bellin viewed
both the capitalist class and the working class as “contingent democrats” (Bellin 2000, 179).
While there are contending views with regard to the middle class’ impact on political
transformation, in the Chinese case the research on the relationship between new middle class
and potential Chinese democratization has yet to find any clear correlation. There is mixed
evidence whether accumulation of wealth among China’s entrepreneurs has fostered prodemocratic attitudes. While some affluent people rely on the state for future prosperity and
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appear content with maintaining an authoritarian political system, others have preferred
competitive politics. Read, for example, has argued:
“…business people can be highly dependent on the state in numerous ways for their economic
success; for instance, for access to capital and relief from extractive predation. Democratization
could well harm, rather than promote, their business interests. Moreover, to achieve their aims
they often rely on individual clientelistic strategies. … other scholars…pointing to a heightened
sense of the common beliefs and interests of private business people and in some quarters
hypothetical support for political competition and an end to the Party’s monopoly on power, but
with little concrete political action” (Read 2003, 37).

Assuming that establishment of civil society may advance democratization, some
research has focused on the Chinese middle class’ participation in associational activities and
examined whether associational life could help develop civil society in China as economic
interests have multiplied and personal freedom has grown (Gold 1990, 18-31; He 1997; Read
2003). Gold argued that with increasing personal control over assets, wealthy people have more
economic interests and may defend them through collective action, given that there is more
openness in the realm of social organization and larger personal freedom (Gold 1990, 31).
Others argued that the newly wealthy “tend to participate in state-mediated associational forms,
which are sometimes described as corporatist, as opposed to generating the type of autonomous
groups that could wield real clout” (Read 2003, 36). Basically, it is doubtful whether the new
middle class members in China are able to establish a mature civil society that will boost a
democratic movement.
In summary, the literature suggest that until now it is questionable whether middle class
will be a driving factor in democratization and whether the Chinese middle class can wield
power to promote democracy in China. Moreover, very little research has systematically
examined the real political participation by the Chinese new middle class members and
particularly their participation in local elections, partly due to the lack of such cases. My
research seeks to fill this research gap by doing individual-level analysis using motivation data
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from the actual middle class candidates who ran for the 2003 DPC elections in Shenzhen and
Beijing.
As China is undergoing major economic transitions, it is worthwhile to explore whether
and how the middle class members participate in politics as their way of life has been altered by
rapid economic changes. For example, purchasing a private home became possible as the
housing reform unfolded in the late 1990s and as the middle class members’ income started to
increase. Ownership of property, one could argue, potentially provides middle class citizens
material incentives to get involved in politics.
Since the CCP took power in 1949, urban housing was owned by governments or by
work units (danwei), and was allocated to urban residents for free. Starting from the 1980s,
China implemented housing reforms to sell existing homes to residents and to build new
commercial apartment complexes for sale. It was estimated that nearly five million square
meters of new homes were constructed each year from 1995 to 1997 (Read 2003, 40).
Once people purchase private homes in newly built apartment complexes or
neighborhood (xiaoqu), they are inclined to protect the properties they own and to maintain the
quality of neighborhood they live in. To do so, they have to deal with two actors that are
involved in the apartment complexes. One is the development companies (kaifa shang) which
construct commercial homes and are either privately owned or owned by branches of
governments. Many development companies make promises to prospective customers such as
maintaining certain size of grasslands in the apartment complex, installing natural gas, building
fitness center, etc. But very often they end up using the proposed budget to construct more
buildings in the complex or simply break their promises after customers purchase homes. This
has been a major reason for the conflicts between homeowners and development companies.
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The other actor is the property-management companies (wuye guanli gongsi) which
handle all community affairs such as sanitation, security, parking, grassland maintenance, etc.
Property-management companies are often owned by development companies or by the housing
management office of the government. Very few are privately owned.11 Many management
companies try to maximize their profits by exacting unreasonable fees from homeowners. When
homeowners have problems with their apartments within the warranty period, the management
companies often ignore them or send them to the development companies.
As individual homeowners found their property interests unprotected, they formed
homeowner associations in apartment complexes to defend their economic interests (weiquan12)
and resist exaction from the management company. However, since management companies and
development companies usually have connections with the government, homeowners have often
been defeated in their battles with them. There have been many cases where activists of
homeowner associations were beaten by gangsters employed by development companies and
management companies.
Being unable to secure their property interests, the homeowners may consider joining the
government to protect their economic interests by using public power. Thus it is a sensible
decision for them to choose to work for local people’s congress and represent other homeowners
as people’s deputies so that they can submit bills for local government to consider and suggest to
formulating or amending laws and regulations to better protect their economic interests. A
number of campaigners in the 2003 DPC elections in Shenzhen and Beijing were leaders of
homeowner associations and they believed that their economic interests could be better protected
if they are represented in the LPCs.13 This suggests a hypothesis worth investigating. Hence,

12
Hypothesis 1: As a new middle class with property emerges, they will be more likely to
turn to politics if they feel their economic interests are at stake. A primary motivating
factor for running for DPC elections is to protect one’s economic interest.
In addition to economic interests, candidates may run for elections for political reasons.
For example, according to Nathan’s research, for the campaigners in 1980 to run for the DPC
elections was an opportunity both to test the potential of the election law amended in 1979 and to
change the state power through the congress (Nathan 1985, 206). While it is hardly realistic to
expect that election to the DPC can seriously challenge state power, it is worth noting that the
campaigners in 1980 had a keen perception on how the law could be used to challenge state
authority and help them reach the goal of democratization. For them, running election
campaigns based on the law was a “first step toward the realization of socialism democracy”
(Nathan 1985, 206).
From the 1980 election we see a strong desire among campaigners to defend their
political rights after the election law was amended. Such a desire has reappeared in the past
decade as people have become more aware of their rights. In a recent study, for example,
Minxin Pei found that the Chinese people’s awareness of their rights granted by state laws and
policies has increased in the 1990s (Pei 2000).
Pei attributed such rights-consciousness to the legal reforms, socio-economic
development and a changing international context. As the level of education increases, citizens
are more aware of the economic policies, legal reforms, and political system under which they
are governed. Moreover, the opening of the state to the international community has enabled the
citizens to observe and experience the political and legal systems in other countries. These
developments have made the Chinese citizens clearer about the rights they hold, and the ones
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that are not allowed by the Chinese authority. As a result, they become more willing to defend
their rights once infringed and more eager to practice rights that were ignored in the past.
People’s desire to defend their rights implies their rights-consciousness.
Under the authoritarian government, many rights that are granted to Chinese citizens by
the Constitution and laws are kept in tight control by the CCP or not allowed to be put into
practice (Nathan 1986, 161). For example, although the election law specifies that 10 or more
voters may collectively nominate preliminary candidates to the LPC deputies elections, the CCP
often replaces the candidates nominated by voters with those it trusts.14 Similarly, although the
law allows candidates to meet voters at “voters’ group meetings” organized by the election
committee, it does not specify whether to allow for election campaigns beyond “group meetings”
as a way for candidates to interact with voters. As a result, voters lose their trust in the election
procedures and they rarely try to nominate candidates conjointly, and candidates barely reach out
to publicize themselves. In the 2003 DPC elections, however, some voters regained their
enthusiasm and assembled to nominate their candidates. Meanwhile, the candidates, including
the independent ones, bravely tested the election law by running campaigns to seek ballots from
the voters. It implies that the new middle class members have a clearer view of the political
rights they hold and are ready to defend such rights. This suggests a plausibility of another
primary motivating factor for the candidates to run for elections. Hence,
Hypothesis 2: The middle class members will participate in politics if they want to defend
their political rights. A primary motivating factor for running for DPC elections is one’s
rights-consciousness.
Some middle class members may turn to politics both to protect their economic interests
and to defend their political rights. In order to protect their property interests by joining the
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LPCs, the middle class members have to understand the advantages and flaws of the political
system so that they may assess the possibility of their success in elections. Once they realize that
certain political rights are not ensured, they will seek to consolidate them so that they are able to
win the elections and have their economic interests ensured. Thus the political rightsconsciousness emerged partly for economic reasons. For some election campaigners, to be
elected as a people’s deputy is a means not only for protecting their property rights, but also for
defending the political rights of being elected in local elections. It suggests a hypothesis to be
tested.
Hypothesis 3: The middle class members will run for DPC elections if they want to
protect their economic interests and defend their political rights.
For some middle class members, to become a people’s deputy may be an honor and it
may be helpful to advance their personal career. In urban China, the ratio between the number of
people’s deputies and that of voters is very small. Normally a people’s deputy represents
approximately 40,000 voters. Although a people’s deputy does not possess real political power,
it still symbolizes an honor to represent a large number of people in the government. The honor
may even be aggrandized considering that being a local people’s deputies is an unpaid job and
people may appreciate his volunteering spirit. Presumably, some middle class members,
particularly the business people, will take advantage of the honor of being people’s deputies as a
way for publicity. For example, displaying his title of being a people’s deputy on name cards
and business publicity materials will increase his credibility and strengthen his credentials. It
may also indicate his connection with the government and affect others’ view on his capacity to
achieve business success. Hence,
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Hypothesis 4: The middle class members will run for DPC elections if they want to
pursue personal honor.
And,
Hypothesis 5: The middle class members will run for DPC elections if they want to
advance their personal careers.

4. METHODOLOGY AND DATA

In order to test the validity of these hypotheses, I will first clarify the meanings of the
variables described in the hypotheses. Then I will find sufficient empirical evidence to measure
the variables and present the evidence by using certain methodology so as to justify the causal
relations to be examined.
The term of middle class has various definitions. I apply and agree with the reference in
the following description: “People with more income, in complex and widely interdependent
work situations, with more education, and more access to health and other services are more
likely to ask for increased political freedom” (Lipset, Seong, and Torres 1993, 166). In this
thesis I mainly refer to white-collar workers, professionals, technicians, and intellectuals as
members of the middle class.
Political rights-consciousness here refers to people’s awareness of political rights ensured
by the Constitution and law, and more importantly, their willingness to defend such rights. In
this thesis, the middle class members’ economic interests are embedded in protection of their
private properties and other property-related interests. The change of levels of rightsconsciousness and economic interests will be explained by the discussion of changing social
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backgrounds in China and will be shown through statements in the interviews of the election
campaigners.
This thesis will draw its data from the newspaper and magazine reports on the election
campaigners. According to the Carter Center’s China Elections and Governance website15,
about 125 Chinese articles, including both news report and scholarly studies, were written on the
2003 Shenzhen DPC elections and campaigns. About 60 news articles and editorials have been
dedicated to the campaign activities in Beijing DPC elections, and another 300 news reports
covering the entire election processes. The news reports are from the newspapers and magazines
publishers all over China. Many of them are not managed by the central government of China or
are known as reporting more independently and honestly. In addition, there are dozens of
Western news reports on both elections in 2003. Meanwhile, data comes from the campaigners’
speeches posted on the Internet discussion boards or quoted by media reports, and their
interviews with the Chinese media. Some of the empirical evidence is collected from the articles
published by the China Elections and Governance website whose managing team sent an
independent observer to monitor part of the election processes in Beijing. As most of the data is
in Chinese, translating the speeches and interviews will facilitate Western understanding of the
candidates’ motivations in 2003 DPC elections. The thesis also refers to and discusses some of
the regulations in the election law of China, which comes from the website of the National
People’s Congress of China.
To test the hypotheses, the data is analyzed in this thesis in two steps. First, I read all
articles, identify the campaigners (N=34), and code the various motivations of the candidates for
running for the offices. Based on this aggregate data, I analyze the results to provide a first-cut
answer as to which hypotheses are most accurate. After presenting and evaluating this aggregate
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data, I conduct a close study of individual election candidates in order to examine in greater
detail precisely how the motivating factors affected the campaigners and prompted them to run
for the elections. As the predictions in the proposed hypotheses are not made by other known
theories, case studies are the best format to capture evidence that may confirm or disconfirm the
hypotheses. Moreover, a successful confirmation of the predictions proposed in the hypotheses
through case studies may provide necessary backdrops for other people to further trace the causal
process and to see how a more general theory works (Evera 1997, 54).
One may argue that the small number of campaigners (N=34) in contrast to the large
number of voters may affect the validity of hypothesized causal relations. Moreover,
considering that there are local people’s congress elections in every city and township of China
every three or five years, the fact that only two cities were found with campaigning activities
may further diminish the significance of the candidates’ campaigning behavior. However, it is
worth noting that because of the rise of campaigning activities carried out by these 34 candidates,
the 2003 LPC elections in Shenzhen and Beijing were extensively reported by the Chinese and
foreign media, and consequently drew extraordinary attention from the public. Therefore,
although the number of cases is small, they are more visible than expected in the public eye, thus
may have greater significance than suggested by their small number.

5. FINDINGS: AGGREGATE DATA

From all relevant articles, I identify the motivations of each of 34 candidates who ran for
the DPC elections and list them in Table 1. Then I categorize the various motivating factors and
identify the candidates who were motivated by each categorized factor (see Table 3). It turns out
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that the data support the first three hypotheses while little evidence supports the fourth and the
fifth hypothesis. I will do an in-depth analysis on the data to illustrate the correlations.

Table 1: Candidates and Their Motivations
No
1
2
3

Name
Maowen Du
Fengchen Yang
Hailiang Nie

Location
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing

4

Xiazhen Shao

Beijing

5
6
7
8

Junchao Chen
Wenbin Zhou
Ruiqi Wang
Liang Ming

Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing

Occupation
Retired
N/A
Businessman
Researcher, Chinese
Academy of Social
Sciences
N/A
N/A
N/A
College Student

9

Yao Yao

Beijing

College Student

10

Menglin Li

Beijing

College Student

11

Min Li

Beijing

College Student

12

Wenjie Ouyang

Beijing

College Student

13

Jun Yin

Beijing

College Student

14

Lei Shi

Beijing

College Student

15

Yuelai Xie

Beijing

College Student

16

Jia Zhao

Beijing

College Student

17

Junhao Chen

Beijing

College Student

18

Riqiang Chen

Beijing

College Student

19

Meng Chen

Beijing

College Student

Motivation
Protect the interests of home owners
N/A
Protect the interests of home owners
Protect the interests of home owners
N/A
N/A
Protect the interests of home owners
Defend the election rights
Defend the election rights
Protect the interests of students
Defend the election rights
Protect the interests of students
Improve his social abilities
Protect the interests of migrant workers, college
students and women
Protect the interests of students
Advance the Chinese democracy via elections
Advance democratic DPC elections
Advance the role of people’s deputies
Advance Chinese democracy and rule of law
Protect the interests of students and other ruoshi
qunti (socially weak groups)
Protect the interests of students
Defend the election rights
Advance democracy in school
Advance Chinese democracy via elections
Defend the election rights
Protect the interests of students
Defend the election rights
Advance democracy in China via elections
Defend the election rights
Protect the interests of students
Defend the election rights
Protect the interests of students and socially weak
groups
Develop Haidian District’s economy,
infrastructure and environment
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Zhaoyong Du

Beijing

Lawyer

21

Xingshui Zhang

Beijing

Lawyer

22

Lihua Tong

Beijing

Lawyer

23

Zhiyong Xu

Beijing

Law Professor

24

Jinbiao Ge

Beijing

Law Professor

25

Kexin Shu

Beijing

Researcher,
Businessman

26

Hai Wang

Beijing

Businessman

27

Youmei Xiao

Shenzhen

Accountant

28

Haining Wu

Shenzhen

Businessman

29

Jiajian Zou

Shenzhen

Employee of a
Telecommunication
Company

30

Liang Wang

Shenzhen

President of a
Technical Institute

31

Bo Xu

Shenzhen

32
33

Yuanbai Ye
Xiaoying Xie

Shenzhen
Shenzhen

34

Shiping Luo

Shenzhen

Engineer, Shenzhen
Urban Infrastructure
Planning Institute
Insurance Salesman
N/A
Deputy Director of
Road Bureau, Baoan
District

Monitor the government
Advance political reform
Defend the election rights
Defend the interest of voters
Defend the political right of election
Advance rule of law
Advance democratization in China
Contribute to public affairs
Protect the interests of students
Defend the election rights
Defend political rights by participating in
elections
Contribute to public affairs
Advance democratic self-determination in urban
communities
Protect the interests of home owners
Publicize the election rights and the functions of
DPCs and people’s deputies
Advance democracy in China
Contribute to law-making
Advance democratic self-determination in urban
communities
Advance the functions of people’s deputies
Set an example for others to participate in
elections
Advance both self-interest and others’ interests
(socially weak groups and home owners)
Publicize the election rights
Protect the interests of voters
Monitor the government
Protect the interests of voters
Protect the interests of home owners
Defend the election rights
Protect the interests of home owners and socially
weak groups by participating in law-making
processes
Publicize the DPC elections and increase the
voters’ rights-consciousness
Represent the interests of students
Honor of the school
Defend the election rights
Defend the election rights
Protect the interests of home owners
Protect the interest of socially weak groups
N/A
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Notes:
1.

2.

3.

It was mentioned at many occasions that Fengchen Yang (No. 2), Junchao Chen (No. 5) and Wenbin
Zhou (No. 6) announced their candidacies as independent candidates. Although their speeches are not
available, all reports that mentioned their names indicated that they appeared as homeowners and they
were listed together with No. 1, 3, 4 and 7. Therefore, it is reasonable for us to assume that the above
three candidates were motivated by the demand of protecting private properties.
Shiping Luo (No. 34) was mentioned only once by the media as himself trying to seek the candidacy and
winning the election.16 But whether he was nominated by the Party or by voters and whether he was an
independent candidate were not known by us. His motivations also were not available.
Due to the data constraints, some campaigners’ occupations could not be found.

Table 2 shows that, in general, most of the campaigners in Beijing and Shenzhen were
members of new middle class in China. It is shown in the data that 68% of the 34 campaigners
were private business leaders, lawyers, and college students and professors. 9% were whitecollar employees who worked for either state-owned or privately-owned enterprises. Another
6% were senior employees in government or government-owned institution. Their participation
has given a special meaning to the 2003 DPC elections.

Table 2: Occupations of the Campaigners in 2003 DPC Elections
Occupation
Private Business Leader
Lawyer
College Student
Professor
Academic Researcher
Assistant to Manager; Senior Accountant
Employee of a Telecommunication Company
President of Shenzhen Advanced Technical Institute
Senior Engineer of Shenzhen Urban Infrastructure Planning
Institute
Insurance Salesman
Deputy Director of Road Bureau, Baoan District of Shenzhen
Retired
N/A

4
3
12
2
1
1
1
1

Percentage
(N = 34)
12%
9%
35%
6%
3%
3%
3%
3%

1

3%

1
1
1
5

3%
3%
3%
15%

Number

21

The data in Table 3 indicates that the following factors have motivated the middle class
Chinese to seek candidacies or conduct campaigns in the DPC elections in Shenzhen and Beijing
(see Table 3).

Table 3: Candidates’ Motivations
Motivation

Specification

Protect the interests of home
owners

Protect voters interests

Protect the interest of students

Protect the interests of socially
weak groups

Defend the interests of voters
(in general)
Contribute to public affairs

Name
Maowen Du
Hailiang Nie
Xiazhen Shao
Ruiqi Wang
Hai Wang
Kexin Shu
Haining Wu
Jiajian Zou
Yuanbai Ye
(Fengchen Yang
Junchao Chen
Wenbin Zhou)17
Yao Yao
Menglin Li
Min Li
Wenjie Ouyang
Jun Yin
Lei Shi
Jia Zhao
Riqiang Chen
Meng Chen
Jinbiao Ge
Liang Wang
Min Li
Jun Yin
Meng Chen
Hai Wang
Jiajian Zou
Xiaoying Xie
Lihua Tong
Youmei Xiao
Haining Wu
Hai Wang
Zhiyong Xu
Kexin Shu

Number

Percentage
(N = 34)

12

35%

11

32%

6

18%

4

12%

2

6%
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Defend election rights
Defend election rights

Publicize the election rights and
the functions of DPCs and
people’s deputies

Advance Chinese democracy
via elections
Advance Chinese
democracy
Advance rule of law
Advance democracy in School
Advance democratic selfdetermination in urban
communities
Advance the role of people’s
deputies
Empower the DPCs
Monitor the government

Liang Ming
Yao Yao
Menglin Li
Lei Shi
Yuelai Xie
Junhao Chen
Riqiang Chen
Meng Chen
Zhaoyong Du
Xingshui Zhang
Zhiyong Xu
Jinbiao Ge
Kexin Shu
Haining Wu
Liang Wang
Bo Xu
Jun Yin
Kexin Shu
Hai Wang
Jiajian Zou
Jun Yin
Wenjie Ouyang
Jun Yin
Yuelai Xie
Junhao Chen
Zhaoyong Du
Xingshui Zhang
Zhiyong Xu
Kexin Shu
Jun Yin
Zhiyong Xu
Lei Shi
Kexin Shu
Hai Wang
Jun Yin
Hai Wang
Zhaoyong Du
Xingshui Zhang
Youmei Xiao

17

50%

4

12%

8

24%

2

6%

1

3%

2

6%

2

6%

3

9%

Advance self-interests

Liang Wang

1

3%

Collective honor

Meng Chen

1

3%

Menglin Li

1

3%

Menglin Li

1

3%

Develop regional economy
and welfare
Improve personal social
abilities

Notes: For a list of candidates and their pledges, please see Table 1.
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1) Protect the interests of voters. The empirical data shows that 35% of the 34
campaigners in the DPC elections of Shenzhen and Beijing were motivated by their
interests of protecting private property, which supports the first hypothesis. In urban
cities of China, conflicts between the homeowners and the developers and property
management companies have become increasingly severe. The homeowners often
find themselves in a disadvantaged situation in striving to protect their property
interests against the developers and management companies. At the same time, they
see the local people’s congresses as a potential political institution through which
they can secure their economic interests through legislation and through government
power.

We also noticed that 32% of the campaigners, all of whom were college students and
faculties, vowed to represent the interests of college students. 18% pledged to protect
the interests of socially weak groups (ruoshi qunti), and half of these candidates were
university students. Finally, 9% and 6% of the candidacy-seekers expressed that they
were willing to represent the voters’ interests in general and participate in public
affairs.
2) Defend election rights. Among the 34 campaigners, 50% of them publicly stated that
they hoped to defend the rights of voting and the rights of being elected through their
participation. Meanwhile, 9% of them hoped to spread the knowledge of election
rights among voters via their campaign activities. Some 19 (56%) campaigners were
known to carry out campaigning activities to help promote election rights granted by
the election law. All these data are supportive of the second hypothesis. In addition,
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15% of campaigners promised to empower the DPCs if they were elected. As most of
incumbent deputies do not function as they are supposed to, sometimes because they
are suppressed by the CCP, the campaigners vowed to serve as responsible deputies
by participating in the law-making process, advancing the functions of people’s
deputies, and monitoring local governments.

Members of the urban middle class usually know more about the political system and
legal system of the country as they are better-educated, sometimes wealthier, and
more open to the outside world. Accordingly, they are more conscious of political
rights and are more likely to struggle for rights that are not ensured in reality. The
campaigners in the 2003 DPC elections aimed at testing the legal regulations in the
election law in order to ensure that their election rights are not fake ones. 18
3) Economic interests and political rights. Seen from the empirical data, 12% (or 4)
campaigners, mainly homeowner association leaders, were not only motivated by
economic interests to run for elections, but also wanted to defend their election rights
and to empower the DPCs. In other words, both economic interests and political
rights-consciousness have collectively made the middle class members in China run
for the DPC elections, which gives some support to the third hypothesis.
4) Advance democracy in China. 29% of campaigners hoped to advance democracy,
rule of law and grassroots self-determination in China and democracy in their
universities if elected. This was especially common among the rights-defenders who
saw the election campaigns as a step to democratization. The data shows that 42% of
those who vowed to defend the election law also called for democratization in China.
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The motivation of democratization was not hypothesized in the thesis but it is not a
surprising result because presumably the defenders of political rights may want to
pursue democracy as a broad goal.
5) Finally, the empirical data does not seem to have strong evidence to support other
hypothesized causal relations. There is no indication that any of the campaigners ran
for DPC elections to gain personal honor. Neither did anyone express to advance
his/her career interests by becoming a people’s deputy.

6. INTERVIEW DATA AND NARRATIVES: DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSES

While the statistical data suggests the overall validity of the hypotheses, analyses of
individual cases of the campaigners will help us examine their motivations more closely. By
discussing the campaign speeches and media interviews with the campaigners, the following
section will show that the campaigners were motivated by their economic interests or political
rights consciousness or both.

Economic Interests

The cases of Mr. Zou Jiajian from Shenzhen and Mr. Nie Hailian from Beijing may best
illustrate how economic interests motivated them to run the DPC elections. As homeowners,
both of them have had problems with the developers and property management companies of
their neighborhood communities. Frustrated by their futile efforts in defending their properties
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interests, both of them saw people’s deputies as helpful in solving their problems thus decided to
participate in the DPC elections and become people’s deputies themselves.
Zou had struggled for a long time with the developer and the management company over
issues related to his and his neighbors’ apartments before he decided to run for the 2003 DPC
elections in Shenzhen. When he purchased an apartment in a high-rise building in 1998, Zou
was promised by the development company that a brand name elevator, probably made by
Mitsubishi, would be installed in the building. Only after he moved in did he find that the
elevator was made by an unknown manufacturer and, even worse, it sometimes went freefall,
which frightened Zou and his neighbors. There were other infrastructure items in the complex
that failed to meet the promises made by the developer before the residents made the purchase.
In 2001, Zou led the residents to file a lawsuit against the developer. They won the case and
were compensated by the developer. Later Zou was elected as chairman of the apartment
complex’s homeowner association.
Being unsatisfied with the services provided by the property management company and
fed up by the unacceptable fees, Zou and his association members unprecedentedly fired the
property management company that was affiliated with the developer, and selected another
company through an open bid. In the same year, Zou was defeated in another lawsuit and was
sentenced to pay 80,000 yuan ($9,756) to the developer who accused Zou for being responsible
for an online post on the homeowner association’s website written by an unknown member
containing scandalous words about the developer.
Then Zou realized that it might be easier to defend the homeowners’ interests by joining
the DPC and being a people’s deputy. However, as an employee of a state-owned enterprise, at
first Zou was afraid that running election campaigns would bring him more trouble. It was not
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until a week before the election day in Futian District that Zou decided to run as a “write-in”
candidate (lingxuan taren19). He grieved to the journalist that “to fight for the residents’ rights
single-handedly has been too difficult!”20 He described his life in the past years as being
intertwined with lawsuits struggling against the developer and the management company at the
expense of his physical and financial well-being. Zou believed that to work within the
government to change rules would be better than directly confronting the developer and the
management company.21
Moreover, as homeowner associations appear in China as newly-born organizations, they
have not been completely incorporated into the Chinese legal system. For example, Zou’s
homeowner association once was declined by the court as not being a qualified legal subject to
initiate a lawsuit when they tried to sue the developer for failing to save enough money for
maintenance of the apartment complex. Zou expressly stated that it was the lawsuits in the past
years in which he was involved to protect the homeowners’ rights that motivated him to run
campaigns in the District people’s deputy elections.22
Zou said, “If I were elected as a people’s deputy, I would be able to submit bills (to the
DPC) and to participate in the rule-making process. I would call for modification of those rules
and regulations that are unfavored by the homeowners. I could use the power of public service
(gongquan) to protect the private rights (siquan23) of the homeowners.” Since he missed the
deadline of candidacy nomination, he put up posters on public notice boards in his community or
beside convenient stores, appealing to voters to vote for him as a “write-in” candidate. On his
campaign poster, Zou wrote, “Please cast your critical vote for a candidate who is courageous to
represent the homeowners to protect their rights.”24
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In the second case, Mr. Nie Hailiang, 1,200 miles away from where Zou lived, was
motivated by similar reasons to carry out election campaigns in Beijing District-level people’s
congress elections in December 2003.
Three years previous to the election, the prospective homebuyers of Huilongguan
neighborhood were told by the development company that they would have a playground and
grassland on a 10,000-square-meter land in the neighborhood. Since then, however, nothing was
constructed and in September 2003, the residents received a notice from the local government
that the deserted land would be used to build new apartments for the Department of Public
Transportation of the Beijing Municipal Government (BMG). The homeowners in Huilongguan
neighborhood were infuriated as their interests were sacrificed by the development company.
On September 14, they went to the BMG and submitted their petition. The government
set up an investigation team but did not come up with any solution. On October 18, some
homeowners were beaten by the construction workers on the land after some oral disputes.
Believing it was an intended action by the development company, some 400 homeowners drove
over 100 cars to the BMG to petition officials there in the evening. Nie was one of the five
homeowner representatives who were able to meet with the officials of Changping District
Government and the developer after the petition. By the time the elections in Beijing were held,
the land had been deserted. Since Nie became well-known among the residents for doing
tremendous work in defending the homeowners’ rights in the past three months, he was
nominated by the residents as a people’s deputy candidate.25
With respect to his participation in the election, Nie confessed that since 1998 when
purchasing private homes became possible, people’s interests are more embedded in their assets.
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Once people are satisfied with their “basic living conditions on clothes and food”, they will have
“time and money” to “pursue their rights.”26
In an interview with a magazine, Nie said, “I represent the interests of those who have
private assets and of the elites of middle- and small-sized businesses…I would like to improve
the humanity and social conditions within the neighborhood, to resolve the conflicts between
development companies and homeowners through legislation, and to protect the interests of
business leaders.”27
Two other candidacy-seekers, Mr. Du Maowen and Mr. Yang Fengchen were from the
same neighborhood as Nie and were also activists in negotiating with the developer and the local
government. Du strongly believed that having a people’s deputy representing home owners’
interests would have made it easier for them to deal with the conflicts with the developer. This
belief motivated him to run for the elections in Changping District. Reviewing the difficulties in
defending their economic interests, Du regretted that the homeowners had no idea who their
representatives in the government were or where they were.28 A retired person in his 60s, Du
sighed, “What if we had a people’s deputy to have our voice heard in the government!”29 He
said, “The repeated failure in defending the homeowners’ rights (weiquan) was the most
important motivation for me to work within the (political) system to defend our rights.” Du
wanted to represent the homeowners and protect their interests if he were elected. “I run for a
people’s deputy because I am a homeowner and I love this community that makes me both
happy and sorrowful. I deeply understand the difficulties of homeowners and I want to try my
best to protect the rights and interests (quanyi) of every homeowner.”30 Du pledged to establish
an office to receive voters and their suggestions if elected.
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In order to make sure that at least one representative of homeowners was elected, later Du
and Yang withdrew from the election and supported Nie’s campaigns. The strategy worked, and
Nie won the election.

Rights-Consciousness

While homeowners desired to protect their economic interests by joining the DPCs,
others (i.e., college students, professors and lawyers) (56% in total) intended to claim their rights
to run for office and to spread the knowledge of election rights among other voters by carrying
out campaigning activities.
Wang Hai, for example, explicitly expressed that his election campaigns were meant to
tell the Chinese citizens that they should be aware of their (election) rights and know how to
defend them. “Many Chinese people are not aware of their rights to vote or to be elected. Even
though they know, they do not use their rights. By participating in the elections, I will prove that
China is a democratic country with rule of law.”31 Wang is well known in China for his
persistent efforts to defend consumers’ rights by intentionally purchasing fake and problematic
products, getting them returned and asking for compensations (Da Jia).32 His efforts were
believed to have helped Chinese consumers acknowledge that they are protected by the “Law of
Consumers Rights Protection (Xiaofeizhe Quanyi Baohu Fa).”33 Similarly, Wang believed that it
would help spread the knowledge of election law among voters if a celebrity ran for office and
generated publicity about the DPC elections. He told the journalists several times, “Through
media I would like to tell people that they should know and use their rights!”34 Wang viewed the
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result of the election as not important as the fact of his participation. “If I were elected, I could
set an example for other campaigners. If I failed, I could learn a lesson to do better next time.”35
Another campaigner, Shu Kexin, chairman of the homeowner association in his
neighborhood, claimed that his campaign efforts were meant to tell people that “the rights to vote
and to be elected are granted by the election law, and voters have the legitimacy to participate in
elections.”36 Shu had a campaign team with two college students as his assistants. The team
designed a poster for Shu and purchased 500 brochures of the election law to deliver to the
voters.37 In order to make the voters familiar with Shu and with the functions of people’s
deputy, the team set up the Shu Kexin’s Election Office (Shu Kexin xuanju shiwu bangongshi)
and called for people to bring their questions before the nomination process started.38 Shu also
visited the residents’ houses to introduce himself by saying, “Weigh your decision carefully.
Then vote.”39
Like Wang Hai, Shu candidly confessed, “I do not have high expectations for being
elected. Even if I were elected, how much influence would I be able to yield as one of the 400
deputies? I only hope to tell people through my efforts that we have rights to participate in
elections.”40 Shu believed that the emergence of election campaigns by other candidates in
Beijing’s DPC elections was partly attributed to himself.41
Shu thought that China has democracy and a good legal system but people need to defend
their rights granted by the law. “China has a rather sound legal system but the law is somehow
covered up.” Challenged by a British journalist that elections are predetermined in China, Shu
responded, “It is not pre-determined. I myself am a self-motivated candidate. It is not that we
do not have democracy. It is that nobody strives for democracy.”42 His assistant, Zhu Sihao, a
college student of Communication University of China, agreed, “The Election Law and People’s
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Deputy Law are implementable. Through election campaigns we want to tell people that the
laws are not abstract legal regulations, and we are exploring a realistic way to exercise the right
of being elected.”43
In fact, Shu and Wang were not only motivated by their rights-consciousness to run for
the DPC elections, they also aimed at protecting the economic interests of the homeowners in
their neighborhoods. Both Shu Kexin and Wang Hai have been activists of defending the
homeowners’ interests in their neighborhoods.44 They met each other at a conference of
homeowners associations in 2000 and decided to form a “Team of Defending Rights” (weiquan
xiaozu) with a lawyer named Qin Bing, who has been well known among the homeowners in
Beijing for filing law suits against development companies and property management companies
in defending the interests of homeowners.45 When the three learned the DPC elections to be held
in Beijing, they decided to seek candidacies and run campaigns.46 Shu vowed to establish his
“Office of People’s Deputy” if elected so that he could “strengthen the communication with
homeowners and better serve their interests.”47 Wang Hai told the journalist that if he were
elected, he would “try to push for democratic management of urban neighborhoods” and
“improve legal regulations to better protect the homeowners’ interests.”48
As shown in Wang and Shu’s cases, the motivations of economic interests and rightsconsciousness co-vary with each other in election campaigns. Since many of those who can
afford private homes are well-educated and have a better understanding of the political rights,
they ran for elections to defend both the election rights and the economic interests.
The student campaigners were also very explicit in defending the political rights by
running for the DPC elections. I will discuss the cases of Yin Jun from Beijing University
(Beida) and Yao Yao from Beijing University of Governance and Law (BUGL).
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Yin, a second-year graduate student, was nominated by student voters of Beida but did
not enter the second phase as a final candidate. Yin decided to run for the election as an
independent candidate. On the university’s BBS49, Yin explicitly stated, “The No. 1 purpose of
my election campaign was to make the DPC elections more democratic (and more scientific) and
to encourage more voters to cast their votes.”50 Yin pointed out that many voters did not even
know there were elections, some electoral staff were not familiar with the election procedures,
and voters were not enthusiastic toward the elections because they did not know of the
candidates and they were not aware of the functions of the DPC. Yin asserted that the reason
why the voters lacked enthusiasm was that there were no election campaigns.
As an independent candidate, he denounced the formal candidates for not doing anything
to publicize themselves and interact with the voters. He said, “An important purpose of my
election campaigns was to give a hard time to those formal candidates who had not expected
themselves to be nominated and who did not expect to conduct campaigns to interact with
voters.”51 Once asked to stop his campaigns by a school senior leader, he responded that he
would stop under the conditions that either he won the election through campaigns or more than
half formal candidates ran election campaigns. “I am not afraid of pressure. I am afraid of
indifference (lengmo).”52
In another case, Yao Yao, a college student of Beijing University of Governance and Law
ranked the defense of election rights as his first motivation to run election campaigns.53 Yao
Yao said in his speech, “As a student majoring in law, it is almost a habit to be conscious of
rights. Thus when I heard of the elections to be held in Changping District, I decided to
participate in the election. I will not only implement my rights to elect other people, but also
implement my rights to be elected.”54
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In their speeches, both Yao and Yin also made commitments to protect the interests of
college students if they were elected as a people’s deputy. However, they did not offer solid
solutions to reach their goals. Nor did they give satisfactory answers to the questions raised by
voters on how they would fulfill their promises. For example, Yin was asked, “How do you
think you could serve as a five-year people’s deputy for Beida while you are graduating in a
year?” In response, Yin warded off the question by saying, “I do not think that is my problem.
Nobody could ensure that he would stay in the same precinct all the time. In addition, I hope to
stay at Beida for my PhD study if I were elected.”55 Neither did Yin offer any specific
suggestion as to how he would fulfill his commitments on adding civil education to middle
school and primary school students and strengthening civil rights among Chinese citizens.56
Indeed, Yin and Yao were similar to other campaigners in seeing their actions more as a
means to defend election rights. Although they all made commitments to solve everyday
problems that concern the voters in their precincts, they did not seem to have a clear idea as to
how they would achieve their goals as a people’s deputy. For example, Professor Xu Zhiyong
from the Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunication (BUPT) said in his speech, “I do
not campaign for my personal interests. I just wanted to tell people: please trust our law…please
believe that we have real election rights, and we need to cherish our democratic rights and treat
our law sincerely.”57 However, when asked what he would do if he were elected, he seemed to
be vague. “I am not very familiar with the detailed working procedures of the people’s
congresses…Five years is a long time, and I do not have any plan at this point…but I will
certainly submit bills…and I will try to push for the rule of law and democracy by participating
in the congress meetings.”58 The candidates’ repeated references to election rights and
democratization have made the voters doubt their capability of solving realistic problems.
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Some campaigners promised to empower local people’s congresses in monitoring the
behavior of local governments and be accountable and obligated if elected as people’s deputies.
This indicates that people become aware of the responsibilities that were supposed to be
undertaken by people’s deputies according to the People’s Deputies Law but had been neglected
in the past. These campaigners hoped to defend the rights granted to people’s deputies by law
and serve as responsible deputies to counterbalance the monolithic power of state authority.
Zhang Xingshui and Du Zhaoyong said in their campaign speech, “We have noticed that,
when making public policies and market economic rules, the power of the government is not
effectively inquired and monitored, thus the decision-making to a great extent overlooks the
feedback from the public opinion. This motivates us to stand out and conduct campaigns in the
Beijing DPCs elections, for the people’s deputies are spokesmen of the public, which is
stipulated by the Constitution.”59 Du and Zhang pointed out that many deputies were entitled to
represent the people but were not doing their job (zai qi wei, bu mou qi zheng). Thus they
wished to become full-time deputies because otherwise “we could not devote enough efforts to
be a qualified deputy”.60
Similarly, Wang Hai argued, “People’s deputies play an important role! The Constitution
delegates honorable power to people’s deputies, but many deputies do not fulfill their
responsibilities…For some deputies, the title is just a rubber stamp and wields no real power.”
Wang believes that people’s deputies could be more useful.61
Lastly, none of the cases explicitly shows that the campaigners would run for the
elections for reasons such as fame, honor and career interests. Even though such interests may
have motivated the campaigners, perhaps they would not say so in the public. Based on the data
used in this study, however, there is very little evidence supporting Hypotheses 4 and 5.
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Advancing Democratization

Among those who advocated the election rights granted by the law, many also sought to
advance Chinese democratization by joining the people’s congresses. Some campaigners
believed that the campaigning action itself symbolized and promoted a democratic way of
political participation. Moreover, once elected, they hoped to serve as responsible people’s
deputies and apply the rights of people’s deputies granted by the Constitution and law so that the
LPCs could represent the interests of Chinese people to wield political power. The campaigners
believed that these plans, if realized, would pave the way for democratization in China.
Campaigner Xu Zhiyong, a professor of Beijing University of Postal and
Telecommunication, believed that democratization is not an “empty word” (konghua) or a
“penthouse” (kongzhong louge). It needs detailed contents and needs people to participate. He
said, “To exercise our election rights within the limits of law is a means to construct our
democracy.”62 Xu argued that although elections by themselves might not advance
democratization, the processes of participation and campaigns would help people see the “hope”
for eventual democracy.63
Yin Jun believed that his campaign behavior was meant to “pave the way for
democratization of his school and his country”, and to “kindle the light for the future of his
school and his country.”64 Du Zhaoyong and Zhang Xingshui were even more idealistic in the
view of the elections. They believed that “nobody could prevent the elites among the
contemporary Chinese citizens from becoming glorious people like Hamilton and Madison. Let
the Haidian District be our Virginia!”65
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In comparison, Shu Kexin and Wang Hai predicted that if they were able to win the
elections and become people’s deputies, they would as least try to advance the grassroots-level
democracy in urban communities. Shu said, “(If I were elected) I would push forward the selfgovernance of the homeowners in urban communities.” “With the institutions for management
established, the homeowners need to learn to protect their property rights and learn
democracy.”66 After knowing that he was not elected, he said, “I hoped to give a try for our
democratic development. And I wish that more people who are more capable than me will
participate in the elections next time.”67 Wang Hai said, “If I were elected, I would first forge
ahead the democratic management in urban communities. I believe that the self-governance of
homeowners will bring ahead the Chinese democratization.”68

7. CONCLUSION

This thesis set out to explain what factors have motivated the urban middle class
members in Shenzhen and Beijing to run for the DPC elections in 2003. By dissecting the
campaign activities, speeches, and interviews of the campaigners, I found mixed motivating
factors which generally support the hypothesized arguments. Some middle class members in
Shenzhen and Beijing ran for the DPC elections to advance their economic interests of protecting
private property. Some wanted to defend their election rights granted by law and test whether
these rights are real ones by running for the DPC elections. Some others were motivated by both
economic interests and political-rights consciousness to run for the DPC elections. Although the
LPCs only play a nominal role at this moment in Chinese politics, the campaigners were
seriously motivated to strive for a chance to protect their private property through the LPC. In
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addition, the study shows that many campaigners wished to change the current status quo in
Chinese politics by empowering the LPCs if they were elected, and such political goals also
justified their efforts to run for people’s deputies.
The results and data presented in this study also have implications for the larger question
of democratization in China and the middle class’s roles in the democratization process. There
are two reasons why the 2003 elections may open a way for the democratic development in
China.
First, the initiation of competitive elections by the campaigners in 2003 may help to
legitimize democratic election procedures, such as popular nomination, transparent
determination of final candidates, and free and fair campaigns in future DPC elections and other
grassroots-level elections. Since the voters watched campaign behaviors by the candidates in
2003 and became more familiar with the election law, over time they may deem campaigning
behaviors as legitimate and expect similar activities in future elections. If such behaviors are
suppressed, voters may demand institutional changes to render more democratic and competitive
DPC elections. The demand will become more imperative if the democratic elections of
people’s deputies eventually empower local people’s congress and chip away the monopoly of
power by the CCP.
The development of village committee elections in China may help us understand how
democratic election procedures can be legitimated and consolidated through practices and the
potential relevance of recent LPC elections. Since its initiation in 1987, village elections were
incrementally implemented in China by the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) officials who are in
charge (Shi 1999c). At the early stage, the MCA reformers did not push hard to implement
absolutely democratic election procedures in villages as the local officials were strongly opposed
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to village election reforms and often manipulated such elections. Once peasants started to
benefit from the competitive elections, they complained about election fraud in the mid-1990s
and would not allow any election manipulation. As observed by Wang Zhenyao, the MCA
official who was in charge of the village elections at that time, “The peasants cared less about the
bad deeds of corrupt officials and more about the way they were elected” (Liu 2001, 4). By such
means, “the MCA could rely on the rural populace to monitor the behavior of local bureaucrats”
(Shi 1999c, 404). Eventually it was easier for the MCA officials to consolidate the democratic
election procedures in rural villages.
Although the function of the urban DPCs differs from that of the village committees, the
democratic and competitive elections of the DPCs may be consolidated in a similar way. Once
voters are more aware of the election law and willing to defend political rights, they will not
accept the CCP continuing to deny the granted electoral rights and to manipulate the elections.
Gradually, institutional change of DPC elections will be demanded by voters to better serve their
goals, either economic or political. However, whether the democratic changes of local election
would by any chance lead to democracy in China remains to be seen.69
Second, the study reveals that the campaigners in the 2003 DPC elections learned to
apply the rights granted by the state law in confronting the monopoly control of the CCP. Thus a
threat may have appeared to the Chinese authoritative government as it might face more
legalistic collective resistance from the people in the future and may have to reform the election
system sooner or later to bridge the gap between what is promised by the law and what takes
place in reality.
As discussed before, the power of people’s congress and the rights of voters are granted
and ensured by the Constitution and the election law. However, such power and rights have long
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been suppressed by the CCP. It is worth noting that for some middle class members, the election
campaigns served as a way to resist the monopoly control of the DPCs by the CCP. For
example, Wang Hai argued that the people’s congress needs to be where the citizens exert their
power, “Our country does not have a institutional system of ‘submitting suggestions’ (najian).
Only if a system of ‘submitting suggestions’ is established could the civil society play its role
and citizens could be the owner of the country.”70 The CCP may feel threatened when it faces
the confrontation from citizens who want to take grip over the power of people’s congresses.
The potential threat to CCP control is even more critical considering that the campaigners are
now equipped with the law. If the CCP continues to manipulate elections and deny certain
granted electoral rights, it may face legal suits by voters. One of the lawyers who planned to
participate in the 2003 DPC elections in Beijing said that he would sue the CCP-controlled
election committee if it eliminated him as a preliminary nominee without giving a reasonable
excuse.71
Although at this moment the capacity of the middle class members in making political
changes in China remains to be seen72, people’s willingness to defend their rights by legalistic
means and their heightened sense of rights-consciousness may have effective power in
challenging and resisting the state. Kevin O’Brien acknowledged that the Chinese villagers have
learned to use “laws, policies, and other officially promoted values” to “apply pressure on those
in power who have failed to live up to some professed ideal or who have not implemented some
beneficial measure” (O’Brien 1996, 41). He illustrated that the discontented villagers in rural
China have learned to cite laws and policies like the regulations limiting “farmer’s burdens” to
ward off unapproved fees or demands for grain that exceed the agreed amount (O’Brien 1996,
33). While some research has examined the Chinese farmers’ collective and legalistic action
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against the bullying rules and policies of local cadres, there is still very little research on the
changing ways of how urban middle class members collectively counteract the state authority by
using laws. This thesis has provided empirical evidence to display such trend.
In conclusion, this thesis reveals the important roles played by the Chinese middle class
in initiating the campaigning activities and making the elections more competitive. It supports
the argument that the middle class is willing to participate in politics when its members are
wealthier and more educated. Such willingness is even stronger when the middle class
members’ property interests are not securely protected and when the granted political rights are
not warranted, as displayed by the middle class campaigners in China. Furthermore, the thesis
suggests that the middle class’s political participation and its demand for democracy may have a
positive effect in spreading the democratic norms among the public and may eventually break
down the authoritarian control of the CCP. As a result, democratization is possible with the
middle class’s participation as a leading force. Such finding may shed light on the theoretical
argument that the emergence of middle class under economic development will contribute to a
state’s democratization process.
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Chinese officials and China scholars have divided views on village election’s consequences on
Chinese democratization. Some believed that village elections have helped establish grassroots
democratic institutions and rule of law, and have made farmers aware of the democratic rights
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